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Torts
William E. Crawford*
Consent to Intentional Harm-Bazley Action
The court in Fricke v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.' introduced
into the Bazlej action the notion that consent bars recovery for an
alleged intentional harm when it is alleged that an employer intentionally
inflicted harm upon an employee or knew with substantial certainty that
the harm would occur.
George Fricke saw fellow employee Melvin Davillier lying uncon-
scious at the bottom of an eighteen-foot deep mustard tank. Fricke
voluntarily descended a rope ladder inside the tank to rescue Davillier,
having first consulted with Baumer, a supervisor. The supervisor went
for help and when he returned Fricke was also unconscious at the
bottom of the tank. Davillier died of his injuries, and Fricke sustained
severe brain damage.
After reviewing the Bazley intentional harm doctrine and the basic
law of intentional harm, including the effect of consent thereon, the
court noted that:
It is uncontroverted that neither Fricke nor Baumer knew that
the mustard tank contained lethal or gravely damaging vapors;
and that neither knew what had felled Davillier at the bottom.
The evidence indicates without dispute that, although there had
been some indication that the vapors had caused breathing dif-
ficulty to a few employees, in approximately 57 years of op-
erations prior to the accident no employee had been rendered
unconscious or seriously injured by the mustard tanks' vapors.,
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant,
and the court of appeal reversed, concluding that genuine issues of
material fact existed so as to make summary judgment improper.
The supreme court found that Fricke "consented to whatever of-
fensive or harmful contact that Baumer desired or believed to [be] a
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James J. Bailey Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 571 So. 2d 130 (La. 1990).
2. Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981).
3. 571 So. 2d at 133 (footnote omitted).
LOUISIANA -LA W REVIEW
substantial certainty would befall Fricke when he descended to rescue
Davillier.' 4
Section 892 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides the fol-
lowing definitions and explanations of the consent necessary to negate
intentional harm: "Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur.",
Comment (b) to Section 892 states that "[c]onsent means that the
person concerned is in fact willing for the conduct of another to occur." 6
Section 892A(2)(b) states that "[tJo be effective, consent must be
to the particular conduct or to substantially the same conduct.",
Conduct is the act of the tortfeasor resulting in the harm. The
conduct of the employer in this case would be the exposure of employees
to lethal mustard gas. Since Fricke did not know there was lethal mustard
gas in the tank, it seems impossible that he was able to have consented
to this conduct.
Prosser's hornbook states that:
The defendant's privilege is limited to the conduct to which the
plaintiff consents, or at least acts of a substantially similar
nature. A consent to a fight with fists is not a consent to an
act of a different nature, such as biting off a finger, or stabbing
with a knife. Permission to dump "a few stones" upon property
is not a permission to cover it with boulders. If the defendant
goes beyond the consent given, and does a substantially different
act, he is liable.'
Perhaps if Fricke had fallen from the rope ladder it might be argued
that he had consented to an intentional harm in that respect, but it
seems very difficult to argue that he consented to exposure to lethal
gas when the opinion itself states that it is an uncontroverted fact that
neither the supervisor nor Fricke knew of this lethal danger.
Fricke's voluntarily descending into the tank would not even qualify
as assumption of risk under the old doctrine.' The essence of assumption
of risk is awareness of the risk.' 0 Without this knowledge of the lethal
vapors, it would be impossible to say that Fricke was aware that there
was a danger of death at the bottom of the tank.
The tendency of the court in recent years has been to lessen the
consequence upon the employee of going to work in a hazardous work-
4. Id.
5. Restatement (Second) Torts, American Law Institute, § 892.
6. Id. at § 892, comment (b).
7. Id. at § 892A(2) (emphasis added).
8. W. Prosser and W. Keaton, The Law of Torts, § 18 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes
omitted).
9. Lytell v. Hushfield, 408 So. 2d 1344 (La. 1982).
10. Dorry v. Lafleur, 399 So. 2d 559 (La. 1981). Assumption of risk as a separate
doctrine was abolished by Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988).
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place." His voluntary appearance at work amidst the hazards of his job
has been specifically held not to be assumption of risk. The circumstances
found by the court to comprise consent were so vague that this appli-
cation of the theory of consent would eliminate virtually all the cases
under the Bazley action.
If indeed the court seeks to slow the volume of employee suits
against the employer in tort, the easier solution would be to eliminate
the "substantial certainty" element of the action. The great majority
of the Bazley cases, such as the instant one, would have little hope of
carrying the burden of showing that the employer actually intended or
desired the injury suffered by the plaintiff. The interpretation of the
phrase "intentional act" would be analogous to the interpretation of
the exclusionary clause in insurance policies for intentional harms. The
court in Breland 2 concluded that the intentional harm exclusion should
be interpreted as a contractual provision, not as a reference to traditional
intentional torts. It would seem logical to interpret the workers' com-
pensation phrase" in the same fashion, restricting the action to injuries
intended and desired by the employer. 4
Products Liability Act Is Not Retroactive-Cigarettes May Be
Unreasonably Dangerous Per Se
In Gilboy v. American Tobacco Co.," the Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed a summary judgment granted by the court of appeal in favor
of defendant tobacco company and held that substantial issues of fact
existed as to whether cigarettes were unreasonably dangerous per se,
whether plaintiff was subject to comparative fault, whether it could be
shown that cigarette smoking caused plaintiff's condition, and whether
the warnings required on cigarettes were effective.
The principal statements of law contained in the opinion were that
the Louisiana Products Liability Act'6 is not retroactive and that cig-
arettes could be found to be unreasonably dangerous per se under
Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. ' by a jury. Another significant
statement was that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act'8
does not expressly preempt state tort remedies and that plaintiff's Hal-
11. Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, Div. of Ervin, Ind., 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).
12. Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609 (La. 1989).
13. See W. Malone & A. Johnson, Workers' Compensation Law and Practice, § 365
nn. 3.5, 3.35, & 3.40, in 14 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed. Supp. 1991).
14. Note, Breland v. Schilling: Louisiana's Approach to "Injuries Expected or In-
tended From the Standpoint of the Insured," 52 La. L. Rev. 199 (1991).
15. 582 So. 2d 1263 (La. 1991).
16. La. R.S. 9:2800.51 et seq. (1991).
17. 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986).
18. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1988).
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phen per se action would exist even if there were a 1966 federal pre-
emption of the failure to warn issue. This point was further included
in the causation issue as to the effectiveness of the warning, the court
pointing out that plaintiff became addicted at an early age before the
warnings on cigarette packages reached their current very specific state.
Burden of Prevention of Unreasonable Risk-Highway Right of Way
In Oster v. Department of Transportation & Development,' 9 plain-
tiff's sixteen year old son was injured when he rode his dirt bike into
a drainage ditch located approximately seventeen feet off a Louisiana
highway. The claim for damages was based on both negligence and
strict liability. For both theories of recovery it was necessary for plaintiff
to establish that the ditch constituted an unreasonable risk of harm.
The supreme court noted that the determination of unreasonable risk
is determined by balancing the likelihood and magnitude of harm against
the utility of the thing, including "the cost to the defendant of avoiding
the risk and the social utility of plaintiff's conduct at the time of the
accident.""0
The court further wisely pointed out that even under the strict
liability theory of Article 2317, the duty-risk analysis must be observed
in order to determine whether the risk and injury complained of falls
within the duty of care imposed upon the defendant. In furtherance of
this analysis, the court observed that use of this particular area of the
right of way for riding a dirt bike was not an intended use of that
area, and the state acordingly is "simply not under a duty to maintain
the grassy area off the shoulder of the road in a condition reasonably
safe for recreational, off-road vehicular use."'"
Perhaps the most impressive point of the opinion was the court's
out-right limitation of the burden on the state:
We think the question is not so much whether the grass was
useful; rather, the question is whether it is reasonable to impose
a rule of law which would require DOTD to maintain every
inch of property within its control neatly mowed or face the
prospect of tort liability. DOTD's jurisdiction extends over thou-
sands of miles of roads in this state. Considering the effect of
Louisiana's climatic conditions upon the rate at which grass
grows, especially during the spring and summer months, main-
taining in a well-mowed condition the grass along all of the
highways in this state would require a Herculean effort on the
19. 582 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1991).
20. Id. at 1289.
21. Id. at 1291 (emphasis in original).
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part of DOTD, as well as a Herculean budget. We do not
believe the law requires such efforts.?
The court thus found that the unmowed condition of the grass
around the ditch did not constitute an unreasonably dangerous condition,
further found that there was no duty to maintain that area for recre-
ational use, and rejected plaintiff's claim.
22. Id. at 1291.

